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The Damascus High Wire: Russia's Ties to Syria

from the January 31, 2012 eNews issue
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Since before the fall of the old Soviet regime, Russia has been a looming force in Middle East geopolitics. While the U.S. has remained an ardent supporter of Israel, Russia (formerly as part of the U.S.S.R) has backed the Palestinians - not through any particular economic need or even ideological alliance, but rather as a counter balance - to stop the spread of "Western influence" in the region. Key ingredients to Russia's power and influence in the region has been its economic and military ties to Syria, ties that are still strong to this day.

Moscow's friendly relationship with Damascus has gotten a bit more tricky of late, however. On one hand, Assad's heavy-handed mess in Syria is not the stuff to win international popularity polls, not even throughout the Middle East. Russia's continued support for the wildly unpopular Shiite regime in Syria could destroy its credibility with the rest of the Arab League. On the other hand, losing Syria as an ally would greatly hamper (if not make practically impossible) a strong military presence in the region.

The Cold War may be over, but Russia still enjoys its role of countering U.S. influence. Keeping its hand strong in Syria also means retaining an ability to back Palestine at the negotiating tables as an effective mediator. In an 2004 interview, shortly before he died, Muhammed Abbas, one-time leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front, was clearly bitter when he said Russia has "not declined but has come to an end," and that Russia no longer played any meaningful role in the region. According to Abbas, "Russia is not carrying out the duties of a mediator on a par with the U.S. Even if Russia does accomplish something, it does it shyly, as if by accident."

Yet Russian military and economic ties to Syria are anything but "shy." According to some reports, recent Russian arms sales to Syria are worth $4 billion, including fighter jets and advanced missiles. Russian business investments in Syria encompass infrastructure, energy and tourism, amounting to nearly $20 billion. A Russian engineering company, Stroytransgaz, is constructing a natural gas processing plant about 200 kilometers east of Homs. The Syrian regime also provides Russia with a key strategic asset: a deep warm-water port at Tartus.

Tartus presently garrisons Moscow's growing Mediterranean fleet, and is therefore worth defending to the Kremlin. The recent shipment of arms delivered to the port underscored Russia's commitment to its multibillion-dollar arms deal while ignoring an E.U. arms embargo. The port is being upgraded to accommodate larger vessels, and Assad declared the port would eventually be home to some of Moscow's nuclear-armed warships. The importance of the port may not be as great as it was in Soviet times, but unfettered access to the high seas remains a driving force for Russian strategic thinking as Russia's main ports are either ice-locked for much of the year or land-locked by straits controlled by other powers.

Ignoring The World:
Normally, financial investment is trumped in the face of international criticism, especially for a country attempting to maintain its influence as a mediating force in foreign affairs. For instance, The United States had billions invested in the Mubarak regime in Egypt, yet halted its support as the people rioted. Yet this seems to be less of a concern for Russia, which, as the world's largest oil producer and second largest exporter, is in no need of oil supplies from the Arab world. Moscow also reaps the benefits of controlling regional energy markets. Russia therefore has no need to appease the predominately Sunni Arab bloc, which is currently acting in tandem with the West in opposing the Assad regime. Instead, Russia has major geopolitical and strategic considerations that dictate supporting Damascus, and for this reason, it appears more important for Russia to demonstrate a confident and sovereign foreign policy in defiance of the West.

In the end, Russia's bold declarations and actions in support of the Assad regime may be, as The New York Times notes, "cold calculations meant to revive its position as a global superpower." This may be true, however, there is an ideological interest in Russian support for Assad's minority regime. Russia has had its share of problems with Islamic dissident groups (c.f. Chechnya), and thus has an interest in "sending a message" to prevent rebellions within its own territory.

For whatever the ideological or strategic reasons, Russia has chosen to back Assad against the U.S., U.N., and Arab League resolutions calling for his abdication, and a re-chartering of Syrian government. The final ramifications of this decision remain to be seen, but one thing is clear: Russia may be forced to choose between a strengthening of its military and economic presence in the Middle East versus its presence as a source of anti-Western influence.